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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks are often deployed in
public or otherwise untrusted and even hostile environments,
which prompts a number of security issues. Although security
is a necessity in other types of networks, it is much more so in
sensor networks due to the resource-constraint, susceptibility to
physical capture, and wireless nature. In this work we emphasize
two security issues: (1) secure communication infrastructure
and (2) secure nodes scheduling algorithm. Due to resource
constraints, specific strategies are often necessary to preserve
the network’s lifetime and its quality of service. For instance,
to reduce communication costs nodes can go to sleep mode
periodically (nodes scheduling). These strategies must be proven
as secure, but protocols used to guarantee this security must
be compatible with the resource preservation requirement. To
achieve this goal, secure communications in such networks will
be defined, together with the notions of secure scheduling. Finally,
some of these security properties will be evaluated in concrete
case studies.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks; Security; Secure
Scheduling; Indistinguability; Nonmalleability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, wireless sensor networks (WSN) have
gained increasing attention from both the research community
and actual users. As sensor nodes are generally battery-
powered devices, the critical aspects to face concern how to
reduce the energy consumption of nodes, so that the network
lifetime can be extended to reasonable times. Therefore, en-
ergy conservation is a key issue in the design of systems based
on wireless sensor networks. In the literature, we can find dif-
ferent techniques to extend the sensor network lifetime [1]. For
example, energy efficient protocols are aimed at minimizing
the energy consumption during network activities. However,
a large amount of energy is consumed by node components
(CPU, radio, etc.) even if they are idle. Power management
schemes are thus used for switching off node components that
are not temporarily needed [2], [3]. Other techniques suitable
to reduce the energy consumption of sensors is data acquisition
(i.e. sampling or transmitting) reduction as data fusion and
aggregation [4], [5].
On the other hand, sensor networks are often deployed
in unattended even hostile environments, thus leaving these
networks vulnerable to passive and active attacks by the
adversary. The communication between sensor nodes can be
eavesdropped by the adversary and can forge the data. Sensor
nodes should be resilient to these attacks. Therefore, One
of the major challenges in such networks is how to provide
connection between sensors and the base station and how to
exchange the data while maintaining the security requirements
and taking into consideration their limited resources. In this
paper we emphasize two security issues:
Secure communication infrastructure: In wireless sensor
networks a sensor node generally senses the data and sends
to its neighbor nodes or to the sink. Stationary adversaries
equipped with powerful computers and communication de-
vices may access whole WSN from a remote location. For
instance, an intrusion detection system detects the different
type of attacks and sends the report to base station. It uses all
nodes or some special nodes to detect these types of attacks.
These nodes co-operate each other to take the decision and
finally send the report to the base station. It requires lots of
communication between the nodes. If adversary can trap the
message exchanging between the nodes then he can easily
tamper the messages and send the false information to the
other nodes. Secure communication is a necessary condition in
order to make the network smooth so that nodes can send data
or exchange the message securely. In our paper, we provide the
definition of a communication system for WSNs, and define
some of the required security properties dedicated to sensor
networks.
Secure scheduling: The main objective of a secure schedul-
ing is to prolong the whole network lifetime while fulfilling
the surveillance application needs. In other words, a common
approach is to define a subset of the deployed nodes to be
active while the other nodes can sleep. In this paper, we
present a novel scheduling algorithm where only a subset of
nodes contribute significantly to detect intruders and prevent
malicious attacker to predict the behavior of the network prior
to intrusion. We present a random scheduling to solve this
issue, by guaranteeing an uniform coverage while preventing
attackers to predict the list of awaken nodes.
The remainder of this research work is organized as follows.
In the next section we provide a general presentation for
security in WSN. A rigorous formalism for secure communica-
tions in wireless sensor networks is presented in III, in which
the notions of communication systems, indistinguability, non-
malleability, and message detection resistance are formalized
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rigorously in the WSN framework. In Section IV, the notion of
secure scheduling is defined and applied on a given example.
This research work ends by a conclusion section.
II. SECURITY IN WSN: GENERAL PRESENTATION
Wireless nature of communication, lack of infrastructure
and uncontrolled environment improve capabilities of adver-
saries in WSN. Stationary adversaries equipped with powerful
computers and communication devices may access whole
WSN from a remote location. They can gain mobility by using
powerful laptops, batteries and antennas, and move around or
within the WSN. In this section, we consider a WSN where
nodes communicate together by sending data publicly. These
transmitted data contain a message whose confidentiality must
be preserved. For instance, transmitted data is the cryptogram
of a message, modulated in an electromagnetic radiation, or
the message is dissimulated into the electromagnetic radiation
by using a spread spectrum information hiding technique.
Wireless communication helps adversaries to perform vari-
ety of attacks. A secure communication can be used to provide
the following general security goals:
One-wayness (OW), the adversary who sees transmitted
data is not able to compute the corresponding message.
Indistinguability (IND), observing transmitted data, the
adversary learns nothing about the contained message.
Non-malleability (NM), the adversary, observing data for
a message m, cannot derive another data for a meaningful
message m′ related to m.
The OW and IND goals relate to the confidentiality of mes-
sages sending through the WDN. The IND goal is, however,
much more difficult to achieve than the one-wayness. Non-
malleability guarantees that any attempt to manipulate the
observed data to obtain a valid data will be unsuccessful (with
a high probability).
The power of a polynomial attacker (with polynomial com-
puting resources) very much depends on his/her knowledge
about the system used to transform information in data.
The weakest attacker is an outsider who knows the public
embedding algorithm together with other public information
about the setup of the system. The strongest attacker seems to
be an insider (he/she is inside the network) who can access the
extraction device (recovering information from data) in regular
interval. The access to the extraction key is not possible as the
extraction device is assumed to be tamperproof.
An extraction oracle is a formalism that mimics an at-
tacker’s access to the extraction device. The attacker can
experiment with it providing data and collecting corresponding
information from the oracle (the attacker cannot access to
the decryption key). In general, the public-key WSN can
be subjected to the following attacks (ordered in increasing
strength):
Chosen information attack (CIA) The attacker knows the
embedding algorithm and the public elements including the
public key (the embedding oracle is publicly accessible).
(NM,CDA2) −→ (NM,CDA1) −→ (NM,CIA)
l ↓ ↓
(IND,CDA2) −→ (IND,CDA1) −→ (IND,CIA)
Fig. 1. Relations among security notions
Nonadaptative chosen data attack (CDA1) The attacker
has access to the extraction oracle before he sees a data that
he wishes to manipulate.
Adaptative chosen data attack (CDA2) The attacker has
access to the extraction oracle before and after he observes a
data s that he wishes to manipulate (assuming that he is not
allowed to query the oracle about the data s).
The security level that a public-key WSN achieves can be
specified by the pair (goal, attack), where the goal can be
either OW, IND, or NM, and the attack can be either CIA,
CDA1, or CDA2. For example, the level (NM,CIA) assigned
to a public-key network says that the system is nonmalleable
under the chosen message attack. There are two sequences of
trivial implications
• (NM,CDA2) ⇒ (NM, CDA1) ⇒ (NM,CIA),
• (IND,CDA2) ⇒ (IND, CDA1) ⇒ (IND,CIA),
which are true because the amount of information available
to the attacker in CIA, CDA1, and CDA2 grows. Figure 1
shows the interrelation among different security notions. Con-
sequently, we can identify the hierarchy of security levels. The
top level is occupied by (NM,CDA2) and (IND,CDA2).
The bottom level contains (IND,CIA) only as the weakest
level of security. If we are after the strongest security level, its
enough to prove that our network attains the (IND,CDA2)
level of security.
III. RIGOROUS FORMALISM FOR SECURE
COMMUNICATIONS IN WSNS
In this section, we present a new principles formalism for
secure communication in wireless sensor networks.
A. Communication System in a WSN
Definition 3.1 (Communication system): Let S,M, and K =
{0, 1}` three sets of words on {0, 1} called respectively the
sets of transmission supports, of messages, and of keys (of
size `).
A communication system on (S,M,K) is a tuple (I, E , inv)
such that:
• I : S ×M×K −→ S, (s,m, k) 7−→ I(s,m, k) = s′, is
the insertion function, which put the message m into the
support of transmission s according to the key k, leading
to the transmitted data s′.
• E : S × K −→ M, (s, k) 7−→ E(s, k) = m′, defined as
the extraction function, which extract a message m′ from
a transmitted data s, depending on a key k.
• inv : K −→ K, s.t. ∀k ∈ K,∀(s,m) ∈ S ×
M, E(I(s,m, k), inv(k)) = m, which is the function
that can “invert” the effects of the key k, producing the
message m that has been embedded into s using k.
• I and E can be computed in polynomial time, and I is
a probabilistic algorithm (the same values inputted twice
produce two different transmitted data).
k is called the embedding key and k′ = inv(k) the extraction
key. If ∀k ∈ K, k = inv(k), the communication system
through the WSN is said symmetric (private-key), otherwise it
is asymmetric (public-key).
B. Indistinguability
Suppose that the adversary has two messages m1,m2 and
a transmitted data s in his/her possession. He/she knows that
s contains either m1 or m2. Our intention is to define the
fact that, having all these materials, the key, and the insertion
function (we take place into the (IND,CIA) context), he cannot
determine with a non negligible probability the message that
has been embedded into s.
The difficulty of the challenge comes, for a large extend,
from the fact that the insertion algorithm I is a probabilistic
one, which is a common-sense assumption usually required in
cryptography.
Definition 3.2: An Indistinguability I-adversary is a couple
(A1,A2) of nonuniform algorithms, each with access to an
oracle O.
Definition 3.3 (Indistinguability): For a public communica-
tion system in WSN (I, E , inv) on (S,M, {0, 1}`), define the
advantage of an I-adversary A by
Adv
I−O
A
= Pr

k
$←− {0, 1}`
(m0,m1, s) ← A1(k)
b ← {0, 1}
α = I(s,mb, k)
: A2(k, s,m1,m2, α) = b

We define the insecurity of S = (I, E , inv) with respect to
the Indistinguability as
InSecI−OS (t) = max
A
{
AdvI−OA
}
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A with total
running time t.
We distinguish three kinds of oracles:
• The Non-adaptative oracle, denoted NA, where A1 and
A2 can only access to the elements of the communication
system.
• The Adaptative oracle, denoted AD1, where A1 has
access the communication system and to an oracle that
can in a constant time provide a message m′ from any
transmitted data I(M ′,m′, k′), without knowing neither
M ′ nor k′ nor inv(k′). In this context, A2 has no access
to this oracle.
• The Strong adaptative oracle, denoted AD2, where A1
has access to the communication system and to an oracle
that can in a constant time provide a message m′ from any
transmitted data I(M ′,m′, k′), without knowing neither
M nor k′ nor inv(k′). In this context, A2 has also access
to this oracle but for the message I(M,mb, k).
C. Relation Based Non-malleability
In some scenarios malicious nodes can integrate the WSN,
hoping by doing so to communicate false information to the
other nodes. We naturally suppose that communications are se-
cured. The problem can be formulated as follows: is it possible
for the attacker to take benefits from his/her observations, in
order to forge transmitted data either by embedding erroneous
messages, or sending data that appear to be similar with what
a node is supposed to produce.
As wireless sensor networks have usually a dynamical
architecture, the (dis)appearance of nodes is not necessarily
suspect. Authentication protocols can be deployed into the
WSN, but in some cases such authentication is irrelevant,
because of its energy consumption, communication cost, or
rigidity. We focus in this section on the possibility to propose
a secured communication scheme in WSN that prevents an
attacker to forge such malicious transmitted data. Such non-
malleability property can be formulated as follows.
Definition 3.4: A Relation Based NM-adversary is a nonuni-
form algorithm A having access to an oracle O.
Definition 3.5 (Relation Based Non-malleability): For a
public communication system (I, E , inv) on (S,M, {0, 1}`),
define the advantage of a NM-adversary A by
Adv
NM−O
A
(m) = Pr

s ← S
k
$←− {0, 1}`
s′ ← A(I(s,m, k))
m′ ← E(s′, k)
: m′ ∈ R(m)

where R : M −→ P(M) is a function that map any
message m to a subset of M containing messages related to
m (for a given property). For instance, if we suppose that an
attacker has inserted or corrupted some nodes in a network that
measures temperature, he can make these nodes send wrong
temperatures values fixed a priori.
We can now define the insecurity of S = (I, E , inv) with
respect to the Relation Based Non-malleability as
InSecNM−OS (t) = max
A
{
max
m∈M
{
AdvNM−OA (m)
}}
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A with total
running time t. Similar kinds of oracles than previously can
be defined in that context.
D. Message Detection Resistance
We now address the particular case where transmitted data
can contain or not an embedded message. For security reasons,
it is sometimes required that an attacker cannot determine
when information are transmitted through the network. For
instance, in a video surveillance context, suppose that an
attacker can determine when an intrusion is detected, or when
something considered as suspicious is forwarded through the
nodes to the sink. Then he/she can use this knowledge to
deduce what kind of behavior is suspicious for the network,
adapting so his/her attacks. Decoys are often proposed to
make such attacks impossible: transmitted data do not always
contain information, some of the communications are only
realized to mislead the attacker. The quantity and frequency
of these decoys must naturally respect the energy consump-
tion requirement, and a compromise must be found on the
message/decoy rate to face such attacks while preserving the
WSN lifetime. However, such an approach supposes that the
attacker is unable to make the distinction between decoys and
meaningful communications. Such a supposition leads to the
following definition.
Definition 3.6: A Detection Resistance DR-adversary is a
couple (A1,A2) of nonuniform algorithms, each with access
to an oracle O.
Definition 3.7 (Message Detection Resistance): For a public
communication system (I, E , inv) on (S,M, {0, 1}`), define
the advantage of a DR-adversary A by
Adv
DR−O
A
= Pr

M0,M1 ← S
k
$←− {0, 1}`
m← A1(k)
b← {0, 1}
α = {Mb, I(Mb,m, k))}
: A2(m, k, α) = Mb

where the set defining α is a non-ordered one.
We define the insecurity of S = (I, E , inv) with respect to
the Message Detection Resistance as
InSecDR−OS (t) = max
A
{
AdvDR−OA
}
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A with total
running time t. Similar kinds of oracles than previously can
be defined in that context.
IV. SECURE SCHEDULING
A. Motivations
A common way to enlarge lifetime of a wireless sensor
network is to consider that not all of the nodes have to be
awakened: a subset of well-chosen nodes participates tem-
porarily to the task devoted to the network [6], whereas the
other nodes sleep in order to preserve their batteries. Obvi-
ously, the scheduling process determining the nodes that have
to be awakened at each time must be defined carefully, both for
guaranteeing a certain level of quality in the assigned task and
to preserve the network capability over time. Problems that are
of importance in that approach are often related to coverage,
ratio of awaken vs sleeping nodes, efficient transmission of
wake up orders, and capability for the partial network to
satisfy, with a sufficient quality, the objectives it has been
designed for. Existing surveillance applications works focus
on finding an efficient deployment pattern so that the average
overlapping area of each sensor is bounded. The authors in [7]
analyze new deployment strategies for satisfying some given
coverage probability requirements with directional sensing
models. A model of directed communications is introduced
to ensure and repair the network connectivity. Based on a
rotatable directional sensing model, the authors in [8] present a
method to deterministically estimate the amount of directional
nodes for a given coverage rate. A sensing connected sub-
graph accompanied with a convex hull method is introduced
to model a directional sensor network into several parts in
a distributed manner. With adjustable sensing directions, the
coverage algorithm tries to minimize the overlapping sensing
area of directional sensors only with local topology informa-
tion. Lastly, in [9], the authors present a distributed algorithm
that ensures both coverage of the deployment area and network
connectivity, by providing multiple cover sets to manage Field
of View redundancies and reduce objects disambiguation.
All the above algorithms depend on the geographical lo-
cation information of sensor nodes. These algorithms aim
to provide a complete-coverage network so that any point
in the target area would be covered by at least one sensor
node. However, this strategy is not as energy-efficient as
what we expect because of the following two reasons. Firstly,
the energy cost and system complexity involved in obtaining
geometric information may compromise the effect of those
algorithms. Secondly, sensor nodes located at the edge of the
area of interest must be always in an active state as long as the
region is required to be completely covered. These nodes will
die after some time and their coverage area will be left without
surveillance. Thus, the network coverage area will shrink grad-
ually from outside to inside. This condition is unacceptable in
surveillance applications and (intelligent) intrusion detection,
because the major goal here is to detect intruders as they cross
a border or as they penetrate a protected area. In case of hostile
environments, security play an important role in the written
of the scheduling program. Indeed an attacker, observing the
manner nodes are waken up, should not be able to determine
the scheduling program. For instance, in a video surveillance
context, if the attacker is able to determine at some time the
list of the sleeping nodes, then he can possibly achieve an
intrusion without being detected [10].
Obviously, a random scheduling can solve the issues raised
above, by guaranteeing a uniform coverage while preventing
attackers to predict the list of awaken nodes. However, this
approach needs random generators into nodes, which cannot
be obtained by deterministic algorithms embedded into the
network. Even if truly random generators (TRG) can be
approximated by physical devices, they need a certain quantity
of resources, suppose that the environment under observation
has a sufficient variability of a given set of physical properties
(to produce the physical noise source required in that TRG),
and are less flexible or adaptable on demand than pseudoran-
dom number generators (PRNGs). Furthermore, neither their
randomness nor their security can be mathematically proven:
these generators can be biased or wrongly designed. Being
able to guarantee a certain level of security in scheduling leads
to the notion of secure scheduling proposed below.
B. Secure Scheduling in Wireless Sensor Networks
Two kinds of scheduling processes can be defined: each
node can embed its own program, determining when it has
to sleep (local approach), or the sink or some specific nodes
can be responsible of the scheduling process, sending sleep or
wake up orders to the nodes that have to change their states
(global approach).
We consider that a deterministic scheduling algorithm is
a function S : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}M , where M > n. This
definition can be understood as follows:
• The value inputted in S is the secret key launching the
scheduling process. It can be shown as the seed of a
PRNG.
• In case of a local approach, the binary sequence produced
by this function corresponds to the moments where the
node must be awaken: if the k−th term of this sequence
is 0, then the node can go to sleep mode between tk and
tk+1.
• In case of a global approach, the binary sequence returned
by S can be divided by blocs, such that each bloc contains
the id of the node to which an order of state change will
be send.
Loosely speaking, S is called a secure scheduling if it maps
uniformly distributed input (the secret key or seed of the
scheduling process) into an output which is computationally
indistinguishable from uniform. The precise definition is given
below.
Definition 4.1: A T -time algorithm D : {0, 1}M −→ 0, 1 is
said to be a (T, ε)-distinguisher for S if∣∣Pr[D(S(Un2 )) = 1]− Pr[D(UM2 ) = 1]∣∣ > ε.
where U2 is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}.
Definition 4.2 (Secure scheduling): Algorithm S is called
a (T, ε)-secure scheduling if no (T, ε)-distinguisher exists for
S.
Adapting the proofs of [11], [12], it is possible to show that
a (T, ε)−distinguisher exists if and only if a T -time algorithm
can, knowing the first l bits of a scheduling s, predict the
(l + 1)−st bit of s with probability significantly greater than
0.5. This comes from the fact that a PRNG passes the next-
bit test if and only if it passes all polynomial-time statistical
tests [11], [12].
An important question is what level of security (T, ε)
suffices for practical applications in scheduled wireless sensor
networks. Unfortunately, the level of security is often chosen
arbitrarily. It is reasonable to require that a scheduling process
is secure for all pairs (T, ε) such that the time-success ratio
T/ε is below a certain bound. In the next section we present
an illustration of this notion.
C. Practical Study
Suppose that a wireless sensor node has been scheduled
by a Blum-Blum-Shub BBS pseudorandom generator. This
generator produces bits y0, y1, . . ., and the node is awaken
during the time interval [ti; ti+1[ if and only if yi = 1.
Let us recall that the Blum Blum Shum generator [13]
(usually denoted by BBS) is defined by the following process:
1) Generate two large secret random and distinct primes
p and q, each congruent to 3 modulo 4, and compute
N = pq.
2) Select a random and secret seed s ∈ J1, N − 1K such
that gcd(s,N) = 1, and compute x0 = s2(mod N).
3) For 1 6 i 6 l do the following:
a) xi = x2i−1(mod N).
b) yi = the least significant bit of xi.
4) The output sequence is y1, y2, . . . , yl.
Suppose now that the network will work during M = 100
time units, and that during this period, an attacker can realize
1012 clock cycles. We thus wonder whether, during the net-
work’s lifetime, the attacker can distinguish this sequence from
truly random one, with a probability greater than ε = 0.2. We
consider that N has 900 bits.
The scheduling process is the BBS generator, which is
cryptographically secure. More precisely, it is (T, ε)−secure:
no (T, ε)−distinguishing attack can be successfully realized
on this PRNG, if [14]
T 6 L(N)
6N(log2(N))ε−2M2
− 27Nε−2M2log2(8Nε−1M)
where M is the length of the output (M = 100 in our
example), and
L(N) = 2.8×10−3exp
(
1.9229× (N ln(2) 13 )× ln(N ln2) 23
)
is the number of clock cycles to factor a N−bit integer.
A direct numerical application shows that this attacker
cannot achieve its (1012, 0.2) distinguishing attack in that
context.
D. Results study
This section presents simulation results on comparing our
approach to the standard C++ rand()-based approach with
random intrusions. We use the OMNET++ simulation en-
vironment and the next node selection will either use our
approach or the C++ rand() function (rand() % 2n) to
produce a random number between 0 and 2n. For these set
of simulations, 128 sensor nodes are randomly deployed in a
75m∗75m area. Figure 2 shows the percentage of active nodes.
Both our approach and the standard rand() function have
similar behavior: the percentage of active nodes progressively
decreases due to battery shortage.
Fig. 2. Percentage of active nodes.
Another result we want to show is the energy consumption
distribution. We recorded every 10s the energy level of each
sensor node in the field and computed the mean and the stan-
dard deviation. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the standard
deviation during the network lifetime. We can see that our
approach selection provides a slightly better distribution of
activity than the standard rand() function.
Fig. 3. Evolution of the energy consumption’s standard deviation.
V. CONCLUSION
In this document, a rigorous framework for security in
wireless sensor networks has been formalized. The definition
of a communication system in WSNs has been introduced,
and security properties (indistinguability, nonmalleability, and
message detection resistance) have been formalized in that
context. Furthermore, the definitions of secure scheduling,
specific to such networks, have been given too. With this theo-
retical framework, it has been possible to evaluate the security
of a scheduling scheme based on the BBS cryptographically
secure PRNG.
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